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Was Gonzales v. Raich the Death Knell of Federalism?
Assessing Meaningful Limits on Federal Intrastate
Regulation in Light of U.S. v. Nascimento.
The powers delegated by the . . . Constitution to the federal
government, are few an defined. Those which . . . remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite. 1

I. INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court decided Gonzales v. Raich2 in 2005, it
marked the first occasion in over a decade that the Court broadly
construed the Commerce Clause to permit federal regulation of intrastate
activity. More importantly, Raich signaled an abrupt end to the
Rehnquist Court’s “federalism revolution” by circumscribing three
recent cases delineating meaningful limits on Congress’s Commerce
Clause powers.3 It represents the boldest assertion of congressional
power to “regulate commerce . . . among the several states” in the history
of the Court.4 Indeed, Raich and its progeny threaten to undermine the
delicate balance of federal and state power structurally imbued in our
constitutional republic by acquiescing to the unbridled exercise of federal
power. Though some have expressed skepticism about the ostensibly
broad effect Raich might have on federalism jurisprudence, recent circuit
court cases decided pursuant to the standards set forth in Raich
demonstrate federal appropriation of “core” state powers,5 including, in
particular, state police powers.
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court should limit Raich by
reviving the limitation on congressional regulation of noneconomic
intrastate activity to circumstances where failure to regulate such activity
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison).
2. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
3. Ilya Somin, Gonzales v. Raich: Federalism as a Casualty of the War on Drugs, 15
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 507, 508 (2006) (“If [Raich] has not quite put an end to the Rehnquist
Court’s ‘federalism revolution,’ it certainly represents . . . a major—possibly even terminal—setback
for efforts to impose meaningful judicial constraints on Congress’ Commerce Clause powers.”).
4. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
5. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. at 42–43 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The States’ core police
powers have always included authority to define criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of their citizens.”) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993); Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 603 n.30 (1977)).
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would undermine a broader regulatory program. The Court should also
narrowly confine Raich’s definition of “economic activity” to prevent
lower courts from “piling inference upon inference” to demonstrate
otherwise tenuous connections to interstate commerce. This approach
would not require the Court to overrule Raich, but merely to enforce the
clear standards articulated in United States v. Lopez6 and United States v.
Morrison.7
Part II provides background on the Supreme Court’s Commerce
Clause jurisprudence between 1937 and 1994—a period of virtually
unchecked federal expansion—and the Rehnquist Court’s “federalism
revolution” between 1995 and 2005 that reestablished limits on federal
commerce powers. This section examines in particular how United States
v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison limited the scope and nature of
activity within Congress’s regulatory purview by (1) moving away from
the “rational basis” test when evaluating Commerce Clause challenges,
(2) limiting regulation to quintessential “economic” activity, and (3)
enforcing the “essential” component of the broader regulatory regime
exception.
Part III explains how Raich largely unraveled the progress made by
the Rehnquist Court. First, the Court adopted a definition of “economic”
that fails to limit the scope of activity within Congress’s regulatory
purview. Second, the decision opens the door to federal regulation of
noneconomic, intrastate activity that falls within a broader regulatory
scheme regardless of whether such activity is “essential” to the larger
regulatory program. Finally, the Court reasserted a “rational basis” test
that effectively eliminates judicial scrutiny of the actual aggregate effect
of a regulated activity on interstate commerce, inquiring rather “whether
a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”8 These standards have
reduced judicial review of Commerce Clause challenges to a rubberstamping exercise where the regulated activity is rationally related to
commerce. More important, they have rendered “as-applied” challenges
to otherwise valid statutes nearly impossible.
Part IV considers one of the first casualties in the breakdown of
meaningful limits on federal commerce powers in Raich’s jurisprudential
wake: appropriation of state police powers through RICO prosecutions.
This section contrasts two nearly identical cases in which federal
prosecutors charged local street gangs members with racketeering for
engaging in intrastate, noneconomic criminal activity. The Sixth Circuit

6. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
7. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
8. Somin, supra note 3, at 509–10 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
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reversed the federal conviction in United States v. Waucaush9 by
applying the clear principles articulated in Morrison and Lopez without
the encumbrances of Raich. The First Circuit, however, affirmed the
criminal convictions in United States v. Nascimento10 by taking Raich to
its logical end, which is to say, by not imposing meaningful limits on the
federal government’s prosecutorial powers under RICO. These cases
aptly demonstrate how Raich encourages judicial acquiescence to federal
appropriation of traditional state powers by narrowly limiting the force of
judicial review.
II. CONGRESS, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, AND THE COURTS
A. Mediating the Tension Between Federalism and the Commerce
Clause Powers
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress
“‘[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution’ its authority to ‘regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States’ . . . .”11 This power is
theoretically tempered by the unique principle of federalism imbued in
our compound republic of duly empowered state and national
governments.12 While this Comment will not exhaustively consider the
virtues of federalism, our system of decentralized government uniquely
provides for responsiveness to diverse regional preferences,13 horizontal
9. 380 F.3d 251 (6th Cir. 2004).
10. 491 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2007).
11. Raich, 545 U.S. at 5 (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3, cl. 18).
12. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549, 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[F]ederalism was the unique
contribution of the Framers to political science and political theory . . . . Though on the surface the
idea may seem counterintuitive, it was the insight of the Framers that freedom was enhanced by the
creation of two governments, not one. ‘In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered
by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each
subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of
the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be
controlled by itself.’”). Id. at 575–576 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, p. 323 (James Madison)
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961)).
13. Somin, supra note 3, at 540–41 (“Public preferences on many issues diverge widely
across state lines. On many social and economic controversies, majority views in conservative ‘red
states’ understandably differ from those in liberal ‘blue states.’ Where such regional differences in
opinion exist, a system of decentralized federalism can satisfy a higher proportion of citizens than
can a unitary policy adopted by the federal government. Red staters can live under conservative
policies while their blue state neighbors can simultaneously enjoy liberal ones.”); John McGinnis &
Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99
NW. U. L. REV. 89, 106–07 (2004) (“To the extent that local majorities in different states have
divergent preferences from each other, a federal system can ensure a higher degree of citizen
satisfaction than a unitary polity . . . . A unitary government with a one-size-fits-all policy will, by
contrast, likely leave a larger proportion of the population dissatisfied with the resulting mix of

320

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 23

competition between states for citizens who can “vote with their feet,”14
policy innovation through social and economic experimentation,15 and
the protection of liberty through diffusion of government power.16
The role of the judiciary in preserving this balance is somewhat
controversial because the Constitution sheds little light on how
federalism should be protected.17 To be sure, the Framers created several
political and structural safeguards to ensure the vitality of our compound
republic. Some argue, however, that the first among these safeguards—
the political process—is the principal or even the sole guarantor of state
sovereignty.18 The United States Senate, in particular, served an
policies. Federalism’s accommodation of diverse preferences can ease racial, ethnic, religious, and
ideological conflicts by allowing each of the opposing groups to control policy in its own region.”).
14. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 13, at 108 (“[T]he theory of interstate competition asserts
that states actively compete with each other to attract new citizens, who can improve their lot
through the power of ‘exit rights.’ Conversely, they also strive to ensure that current residents will
not depart for greener pastures offered by competitors. Citizens dissatisfied with state policy not
only have the option of lobbying for change, but also of moving to another state that deliberately
seeks to attract them with more favorable policies.”); Ilya Somin, Revitalizing Consent, 23 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 753, 795–97 (2000).
15. Raich, 545 U.S. at 42–43 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“One of federalism’s chief virtues,
of course, is that it promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility that ‘a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.’”) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); McGinnis & Somin, supra note13, at 108.
16. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
458–459 (1991) (“Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal
Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy
balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and
abuse from either front . . . . In the tension between federal and state power lies the promise of
liberty.”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution divides
authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals. State sovereignty
is not just an end in itself: ‘Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the
diffusion of sovereign power.’”) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759, (1991)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
17. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Of the various structural
elements in the Constitution, separation of powers, checks and balances, judicial review, and
federalism, only concerning the last does there seem to be much uncertainty respecting the existence,
and the content, of standards that allow the Judiciary to play a significant role in maintaining the
design contemplated by the Framers . . . . Our role in preserving the federal balance seems more
tenuous.”).
18. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550–51 (1985) (“It
is no novelty to observe that the composition of the Federal Government was designed in large part
to protect the States from overreaching by Congress. The Framers thus gave the States a role in the
selection both of the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government. The States
were vested with indirect influence over the House of Representatives and the Presidency by their
control of electoral qualifications and their role in Presidential elections.”); RALPH A. ROSSUM,
FEDERALISM, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT: THE IRONY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 93 (2001) (“The framers understood that federalism would be
protected structurally—the mode of electing (and reelecting) the Senate making it in the self-interest
of senators to preserve the original federal design and to protect the interests of states as states.”). Id.
at 93; Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 559 (1954)
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important role in representing state interests at the national level until the
Seventeenth Amendment undercut the states’ influence by replacing state
legislatures’ appointment powers with popular election.19
The political process was not, however, the sole mechanism
envisioned by the Framers for warding off federal encroachment. Indeed,
they saw the Supreme Court as a final check on the national government,
and frequently raised this argument in ratification debates to ward off
claims that the proposed constitution would facilitate a unitary
government.20 Even the early Court acknowledged the role of the
judiciary in defining the limits of federal power vis-à-vis the states.21
Historically, judicial intervention—rather than political safeguards—has
been the surest check on federal encroachment, though the Court’s
willingness to impose limits on federal power fluctuates according to the
philosophical posture of the majority.
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky explains that the Court vacillates
between two views about the underlying structure of American
government: one that treats federalism as “empowerment” and another
that treats federalism as a fundamental limit on government power.22 The
first model—federalism as empowerment—emphasizes the benefit of
having multiple levels of government deal with social and economic
problems where the failures of one can be compensated by the other.23
Those who view federalism as empowerment give the Commerce Clause
(arguing that “federal intervention as against the states is thus primarily a matter for congressional
determination,” that judicial review in the context of federalism is primarily limited to the
maintenance of national supremacy against nullification or usurpation by states, and “the Court is on
weakest ground when it opposes its interpretation of the Constitution to that of Congress in the
interest of the States . . . .”).
19. See Jay Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens’ Song of the
Seventeenth Amendment, 91 NW. U. L. Rev. 500 (1997).
20. See John Yoo, Federalism and Judicial Review, in THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE
SOVEREIGNTY 147–59 (Mark R. Killenbeck, ed., 2002); see generally John Yoo, The Judicial
Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311 (1997); Roger G. Brooks, Garcia, the
Seventeenth Amendment, and the Role of the Supreme Court in Defending Federalism, 10 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 189 (1987).
21. See McCullouch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819) (“Th[e] [federal] government is
acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the
powers granted to it . . . is now universally admitted. But the question respecting the extent of the
powers actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, so long as our
system shall exist.”); id. at 423 (“Should congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures
which are prohibited by the constitution; or should congress, under the pretext of executing its
powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government; it would
become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to
say, that such an act was not the law of the land.”) (emphasis added).
22. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assumptions of Federalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1763, 1766–67
(2006).
23. Id. (“The benefit of having many levels of government is that there are multiple power
centers capable of acting. Federal and state courts, from this view, both should be available to
protect constitutional rights.”).
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and the Fourteenth Amendment expansive readings to facilitate federal
action while leaving limitations on federal action to the political process
and other constitutional mechanisms, such as the separation of powers.24
Those who treat federalism as a limit on federal power, however, see
it as the Court’s responsibility to narrowly define the parameters of
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.25 Since the Court plays an active
role in safeguarding other aspects of our constitutional framework—
namely, separation of powers, checks and balances, and judicial
review26—the responsibility to preserve balance between federal and
state power—an equally important component of the Framers’ design—
is no less incumbent upon the judicial branch.27 Indeed, proponents of
limits see the Court’s failure to fulfill this responsibility as a threat to our
entire system of government,28 and thus read the Tenth Amendment
broadly to protect the prerogatives of state governments.29 The following
provides a brief treatment of the vacillating trends in the Court’s
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
B. The First Death of Federalism30
The history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence could be summed up
as a general trend of federal empowerment punctuated by short-lived
attempts to establish meaningful and enduring limits on federal

24. Id. at 1767.
25. Id.
26. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Of the various structural elements in
the Constitution, separation of powers, checks and balances, judicial review, and federalism, only
concerning the last does there seem to be much uncertainty respecting the existence, and the content,
of standards that allow the Judiciary to play a significant role in maintaining the design contemplated
by the Framers.”). Though the standards for preserving separation of powers and checks and
balances are “well accepted,” and those for judicial review are “beyond question,” the Court has yet
to establish enduring standards for preserving federalism despite the fact that it ranks among the four
primarily, structural elements of the Framers’ constitutional design. Id. at 577–76.
27. Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 1767.
28. Id. During the early twentieth century—a period of judicial limitation—the Court took
seriously its charge to limit federal commerce powers. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corporation v. U.S, 295 U.S. 495, 548 (1935) (“[Limiting federal Commerce Clause powers is]
essential to the maintenance of our constitutional system. Otherwise, as we have said, there would be
virtually no limit to the federal power, and for all practical purposes we should have a completely
centralized government.”); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918) (“The far reaching
result of upholding the act cannot be more plainly indicated than by pointing out that if Congress can
thus regulate matters entrusted to local authority by prohibition of the movement of commodities in
interstate commerce, all freedom of commerce will be at an end, and the power of the states over
local matters may be eliminated, and thus our system of government be practically destroyed.”).
29. Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 1767.
30. See A. Christopher Bryant, The Third Death of Federalism, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 101, 102–06 (2007) (describing the three historical “deaths” of federalism in Supreme Court
jurisprudence).
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commerce authority. The first such attempt began around the turn of the
twentieth century31 and gained momentum as the Court tried to impose
limits on President Roosevelt’s expansive New Deal programs.32 In the
face of overwhelming support for President Roosevelt’s vision for the
country, in addition to his famous threat to “pack the court” with
additional justices amenable to New Deal policy, the Court ultimately
relented in its fight against the burgeoning national government.33
Beginning with a series of cases in 1937, the Court embarked on a
trajectory of federal empowerment that persisted for a period of fiftyseven years during which the court sustained nearly every exercise of the
Commerce Clause powers.34
The Court not only abandoned serious review of federal regulatory
activity, but went on to provide a very broad reading of the Commerce
Clause in Wickard v. Filburn—allowing Congress to regulate wholly
intrastate, non-commercial activity35—and introduced an impossibly high
barrier to Commerce Clause challenges with a “rational basis” test for
congressional action in Katzenbach v. McClung.36 In the first case,
Filburn challenged wheat marketing quotas imposed by the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938 by arguing that his private consumption of
wheat grown in excess of the quota was a wholly intrastate, noncommercial activity, and thus not subject to regulation under the
Commerce Clause.37 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding
that even if an activity is local and not strictly commercial, “it may still,
whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
31. During this period the Court attempted to limit federal commerce powers by excluding
activities deemed “purely local” from the purview of congressional regulation. See, e.g., Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275–76 (1918) (striking down the Keating-Owen Act of 1916 prohibiting
the interstate transfer of any merchandise manufactured by children because manufacturing is a
“purely local” activity); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1895) (dismissing a
federal antitrust suit against a sugar refining company because manufacturing is a “local” activity
exclusively within the states’ police powers).
32. Lino A. Graglia, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich: Federalism in the Rehnquist Court, 31
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 761, 763–64 (2008). See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238,
291 (1936); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62–63 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528–29 (1935).
33. Graglia, supra note 32, at 763 (noting that “[i]n the end, President Roosevelt did not even
need to make good on his ‘court packing’ threat to win over the support of the Court, as his landslide
reelection in 1936 apparently convinced Justice Owen Roberts, the swing vote in most of the New
Deal cases, that he could not save the country from a centralization of power from which it did not
want to be saved.”).
34. Id.; see United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918)); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937); NLRB v.
Freidman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 75 (1937); NLRB v. Freuhauf Trailer Co., 301
U.S. 49, 57 (1937).
35. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
36. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
37. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 113–15.
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economic effect on interstate commerce.”38 The Court explained that
while Congress was attempting to stabilize wheat prices by limiting
supply, private consumption of wheat that would otherwise be purchased
from the market would reduce the demand for—and thus the price of—
that commodity.39 Although Filburn’s individual consumption was
seemingly insubstantial, such activity taken in the aggregate has a
“substantial influence” on interstate price and market conditions and
therefore lends itself to congressional regulation.40
Later, in Katzenbach, the Court rejected a challenge to the
constitutionally of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as applied to a restaurant
serving primarily intrastate customers.41 The Court applied a “rational
basis” test to Congress’s determination that racial discrimination in the
restaurant adversely affected interstate commerce, and should thus be
rectified through federal intervention.42 Although the tenuous links
between Ollie’s Barbecue and interstate commerce included only
consumption of food that had travelled through interstate commerce and
close proximity to an interstate highway, 43 the Court deferred to
Congress, stating, “where we find that the legislators, in light of the facts
and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen
regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our
investigation is at an end.”44
Under the “rational basis” paradigm conceived in Katzenbach, the
Commerce Clause indeed “acknowledged no limitations.”45 To be sure,
the Court recognized an extreme limit on commerce regulation, warning
in Jones & Laughlin Steel that the scope of the commerce power
must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and
may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce
so indirect and remote that to embrace them . . . would effectually
38. Id. at 125, 129.
39. Id. at 128.
40. Id. at 128–29.
41. 379 U.S. 294, 303–04 (1964).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 296–97.
44. Id. at 303–04 (emphasis added).
45. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824). Although Chief Justice Marshall gave the
Commerce Clause a profoundly broad reading in Gibbons, his understanding of Congress’s power
did not find application until after the refitting of the New Deal Court. See also Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981) (holding that the Court “must defer
to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any
rational basis for such a finding”). The Hodel Court reiterated Chief Justice Marshall’s assessment of
the Commerce Clause power as one that is “‘complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution.’” Id. (quoting
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196).
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obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and
create a completely centralized government.”46

Three decades passed, however, before the Court again found the
wherewithal to impose meaningful limits on the Commerce Clause
powers.
C. The “Rehnquist Revolution”
Following a half-century of nearly unquestioned judicial
acquiescence, the Rehnquist Court revived federalism as a substantive
limit on the Commerce Clause powers with renewed emphasis on the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments.47 As an associate justice, Rehnquist
found initial success in articulating the outer limits of congressional
power in National League of Cities v. Usery, 48 but the Burger Court
reversed course shortly thereafter in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.49 The true force and substance of the “Rehnquist
Revolution” came later when the composition of the Court became more
amenable to the idea of resuscitating constitutional constraints on the
commerce powers.50 The following sections provide a brief review of the
Rehnquist Court’s most significant contributions to contemporary
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
1. United States v. Lopez
In 1995, the Court affirmed a facial attack on the Gun-Free School
Zones Act (“GFSZ Act”) as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s
authority to regulate commerce.51 The GFSZ Act made it a federal
offense to “knowingly possess a firearm at a place that the individual

46. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
47. DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., THE REHNQUIST COURT: UNDERSTANDING ITS IMPACT AND
LEGACY 58–59 (2007).
48. 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (holding that the Tenth Amendment bars Congress from
exercising its commerce powers to regulate wages, hours and benefits of state employees because
such action infringes upon the states’ independent plenary authority over traditional government
functions), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); HUDSON,
supra note 47, at 56–58.
49. 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to
extend the Fair Labor Standards Act—which regulates wages, hours and benefits—to state and local
governments), rev’g National League of Cities, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
50. HUDSON, supra note 47, at 58–62. The appointment of Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony
Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas gave Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor a profederalism majority.
51. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
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knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.”52 Alfonso
Lopez, a 12th-grade student in San Antonio, Texas, challenged the GFSZ
Act after federal prosecutors charged him for carrying a concealed .38caliber handgun to school. The district court found him guilty, but the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that in light of
insufficient congressional findings and legislative history, “section
922(q) . . . is invalid as beyond the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause.”53
In its watershed opinion affirming the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme
Court identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may
regulate under its commerce power: (1) the “use of the channels of
interstate commerce”; (2) “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
or persons or things in interstate commerce”; and (3) “those activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce.”54 Reasoning that the GunFree School Zone Act could only fall within the third category, the Court
explained that such regulation may only target intrastate economic
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, or activity that is
an essential part of a larger regulatory or economic activity “in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated.”55
The Court concluded, however, that the GFSZ Act in question is a
“criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or
any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those
terms.”56 Since the targeted activity is not part of a larger regulatory
scheme, and the statute provides neither a case-by-case jurisdictional
hook to interstate commerce nor congressional findings to substantiate
such a relationship, the statute is facially unconstitutional as beyond the
bounds of Congress’s commerce authority.57 The Court ultimately
refused to equate firearm possession with economic activity, stating that
“the possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an
economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially
affect any sort of interstate commerce.”58
The Court also rejected the notion that a “rational basis” test for
Congressional action can be applied to all Commerce Clause disputes.
The dissenting justices argued that the Constitution demands leeway

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V)).
Id. at 552 (quoting 2 F.3d 1342, 1367–68 (1993)).
Id. at 558–59 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 559–61.
Id.
Id. at 561–63.
Id. at 567.
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from the Court in determining the existence of a significant connection
between the regulated activity and interstate commerce, and that a
reviewing court need only find a rational basis for Congress’s policy
judgment.59 The dissenting justices accordingly found a rational link
between gun-related violence in schools and interstate commerce worthy
of deference.60 The majority, however, explicitly rejected the dissent’s
reasoning that “(1) gun-related violence is a serious problem; (2) that
problem, in turn, has an adverse effect on classroom learning; and (3)
that adverse effect on classroom learning, in turn, represents a substantial
threat to trade and commerce.”61 This approach, Chief Justice Rehnquist
explained, requires the Court to “pile inference upon inference in a
manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the
States.”62 Indeed, the traditional “rational basis” test proposed by Justice
Breyer admits to no substantive limits on Congress’s power because “any
activity can be looked upon as commercial.”63 For the first time in more
than fifty years, the Court drew the proverbial line in the sand. To further
acquiesce to Congress’s encroachment, Justice Rehnquist reasoned,
would require the Court to conclude “that the Constitution’s enumeration
of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated, . . . and that
there will never be a distinction between what is truly national and what
is truly local.”64

59. Id. at 616–17 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joining in
the dissent) (“[T]he Constitution requires us to judge the connection between a regulated activity and
interstate commerce, not directly, but at one remove. Courts must give Congress a degree of leeway
in determining the existence of a significant factual connection between the regulated activity and
interstate commerce—both because the Constitution delegates the commerce power directly to
Congress and because the determination requires an empirical judgment of a kind that a legislature is
more likely than a court to make with accuracy. The traditional words ‘rational basis’ capture this
leeway.”).
60. Id. at 621–24. (“The evidence of (1) the extent of the gun-related violence problem, . . .
(2) the extent of the resulting negative effect on classroom learning, . . . and (3) the extent of the
consequent negative commercial effects, . . . when taken together, indicate a threat to trade and
commerce that is ‘substantial.’ At the very least, Congress could rationally have concluded that the
links are ‘substantial.’”). Id. at 623.
61. Id. at 565 (Rehnquist, C.J., majority).
62. Id .at 567.
63. Id. at 564–65 (emphasis added) (“Although Justice Breyer argues that acceptance of the
Government’s rationales would not authorize a general federal police power, he is unable to identify
any activity that the States may regulate but Congress may not. Justice Breyer posits that there might
be some limitations on Congress’ commerce power, such as family law or certain aspects of
education . . . . These suggested limitations, when viewed in light of the dissent’s expansive analysis,
are devoid of substance.”). Id.
64. Id. at 567–68 (internal citations omitted).
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2. United States v. Morrison
Five years later, the Rehnquist Court rearticulated the constitutional
limits on federal regulation of noneconomic, intrastate activity by
invalidating section 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act as an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s commerce powers.65 Two
Virginia Tech students challenged the Act, which provides a federal civil
remedy for victims of crimes motivated by gender,66 after they were sued
under the Act for allegedly assaulting and raping a female colleague.67
The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court and an en banc panel of
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in deciding that Congress’s attempt
to regulate noneconomic, intrastate, violent criminal conduct through
section 13981 of the Act exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause
powers.68
As with the Gun-Free School Zone Act in Lopez, the Violence
Against Women Act was enacted under the third category of Congress’s
commerce powers, or, more specifically, Congress’s authority to regulate
those activities which have a substantial affect on interstate commerce.69
Guided by Lopez, the Court articulated four standards that govern review
of statutes enacted pursuant to this power: first, the regulated activity
must be quintessentially economic;70 second, reviewing courts should
consider whether the statute includes a jurisdictional element in
pursuance of Congress’s commerce powers;71 third, courts may consider
Congressional findings to evaluate the legislative judgment that a
targeted activity substantially affects interstate commerce, particularly
where such effect is not readily visible;72 and fourth; courts should be
wary of “attenuated” links between a regulated activity and its effect on
interstate commerce.73

65. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
66. Id. at 605–06.
67. Id. at 602–04.
68. Id. at 604–05, 617–19.
69. Id. at 609.
70. Id. at 610–11 (“[A] fair reading of Lopez shows that the non-economic, criminal nature of
the conduct at issue was central to our decision in that case . . . . Lopez’s review of Commerce
Clause case law demonstrates that in those cases where we have sustained federal regulation of
intrastate activity based upon the activity’s substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in
question has been some sort of economic endeavor”) (emphasis added); id. at 613 (“[T]hus far in our
Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where
that activity is economic in nature.”) (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 611–12.
72. Id. at 612.
73. Id. at 612–13.
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With respect to the final criterion, the Court reiterated its warning in
Lopez that accepting attenuated links between a targeted activity and its
effect on commerce “would permit Congress to ‘regulate not only all
violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime,
regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce.’”74
Indeed, “‘Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related
to the economic productivity of individual citizens: [including] family
law . . . . [I]t is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even
in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States
historically have been sovereign.’”75
In its review of the Violence Against Women Act, the Court found
that the Act not only failed to target economic activity,76 but relied on
highly attenuated links between violence against women and interstate
commerce.77 Although Congress provided ample evidence to support its
finding that gender-motivated violence has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce, the Court explained that the existence of
congressional findings is not independently sufficient to sustain the
constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.78 Indeed, although “the
political branches have a role in interpreting and applying the
Constitution, . . . ever since Marbury this Court has remained the
ultimate expositor of the constitutional text.”79 Thus, whether a particular
operation affects interstate commerce sufficiently to fall within
Congress’s constitutional purview “‘is ultimately a judicial rather than a
legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Court.’”80
The Morrison Court ultimately rejected the notion that “Congress
may regulate non-economic, violent criminal conduct based solely on
that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.”81 This decision
is consistent with the Court’s long-standing recognition that “regulation
and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the
instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has
always been the province of the States.”82 As Chief Justice Rehnquist
emphasized, the suppression of violent crime and the vindication of its

74. Id. at 613 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995)).
75. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564).
76. Id. (“Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic
activity”).
77. Id. at 613–16.
78. Id. at 614.
79. Id. at 616 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 614 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964)
(Black, J., concurring)).
81. Id. at 617.
82. Id. at 618.
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victims are perhaps the best examples of the police power that the
Founders denied the National Government.83 The Court accordingly
refused to sustain section 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act,
noting that the Commonwealth of Virginia must provide the due remedy.
3. Jones v. United States84
Decided concurrently with Morrison, United States v. Jones applies
the principles articulated in Lopez and Morrison to “as-applied”
challenges to otherwise valid statutes. The unanimous Jones Court held
that federal authorities could not pursue charges under a federal arson
statute—making it a crime to “damage or destroy, ‘by means of fire or an
explosive, any . . . property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in
any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce’”85—against a
defendant involved in the arson of a private, owner-occupied residence
not used for any commercial purpose.86
In 1998, a federal jury convicted petitioner-defendant Dewey Jones
under 18 U.S.C. section 844(i)—enacted as part of Title XI of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970—for throwing a Molotov cocktail
through the window of his cousin’s home and causing substantial
damage to the residential structure.87 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, and
Jones appealed arguing that section 844(i), as applied to the arson of a
private residence not used for commercial purposes, exceeded the
authority vested in Congress under the Commerce Clause.88
The government defended Jones’ conviction by relying on the
“affecting . . . commerce” language of the statute, arguing that the
homeowner’s use of the property to obtain a mortgage loan and natural
gas resources from out-of-state companies established sufficient effects
on interstate commerce.89 The Court noted, however, that the statute
requires the affected building to be “used” in an activity affecting
commerce, which ostensibly means “active employment for commercial
purposes.”90 Since “everyday living” does not constitute a commercial
83. Id. at 618–19 (“‘The Constitution . . . withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police
power.’”) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995)); id. (“‘We always have
rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that would permit
Congress to exercise a police power.’”) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584–85 (Thomas, J.,
concurring)).
84. 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
85. Id. at 850 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994 ed., Supp. IV)).
86. Id. at 850–51.
87. Id. at 851.
88. Id. at 851–52.
89. Id. at 855.
90. Id.
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activity,91 the Court reversed, explaining that to hold otherwise would
permit Congress to criminalize the arson of virtually any building in the
country since they all were seemingly constructed with supplies that
moved in interstate commerce, are served by utilities that have an
interstate connection, were financed or insured by out-of-state
enterprises, or bear some other “trace” of interstate commerce.92 The
Court warned further that when a statute is “susceptible of two
constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional
questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided,”
the Court’s duty is to accept the latter.93 Thus, as in Lopez—where the
federal government sought to regulate a criminal activity “of traditional
state concern”—the Court rejected any construction of section 844(i) that
would render the “traditionally local criminal conduct” in which Jones
engaged “a matter for federal enforcement.”94
D. Reasserting Limits of Congress’s Commerce Powers
Lopez, Morrison, and Jones breathed new life into the notion that
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers do not provide an unlimited
reservoir of regulatory authority extending to every activity rationally
linked to interstate commerce. More than anything, the Rehnquist
revolution reasserted an analytical framework mindful of the Court’s role
in asserting limits on commerce regulation necessary to protect the
structural division of power between state and national governments.
The first—and perhaps the most “revolutionary”—of the several
principles articulated during this era of renewed limitation is that the
Supreme Court is not limited to a “rational basis” test when evaluating
challenges to Commerce Clause legislation.95 While legislative findings
may inform the Court’s judgment, Marbury unequivocally established
the principle that “‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is,’”96 and, accordingly, the
Court has reasserted its role in articulating limitations on federal
commerce authority. Second, the Court limited Congress’s regulatory
powers under the Commerce Clause to quintessential “commercial” or
“economic” activity, though the majority never defined the specific

91. Id. at 856.
92. Id. at 857.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 858 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971)).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 78–80.
96. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 (2000) (quoting United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974)) (emphasis added).
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parameters of these categories.97 Third, Lopez and Morrison reaffirmed
the pre-New Deal test requiring that regulated activity, taken in the
aggregate, must exert a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce,98 and
thus refused to validate tenuous legislative judgments that pile inference
upon inference to establish some connection between intrastate activity
and interstate commerce.99 Finally, the Court stressed the imperative of
protecting areas of “traditional state concern” from federal
encroachment100 by exempting intrastate criminal conduct from
Congress’s regulatory purview where such conduct does not target
instrumentalities, channels, or goods in interstate commerce.101
These standards would not prove resilient, however, in the face of a
uniquely challenging case pitting the rights of state-sanctioned medicinal
marijuana users against the federal government’s anti-drug regime. In the
case that follows, the Court abruptly reverted to its pre-Lopez analytical
framework and upset the promise of the Rehnquist revolution.
III. RAICH AND THE “THIRD DEATH OF FEDERALISM”: AN END TO
MEANINGFUL LIMITS ON CONGRESS’S COMMERCE POWERS?
A. Gonzales v. Raich102
When the Supreme Court decided Raich in 2005, the majority
effectively eviscerated the constitutional limits established by the
previous decade of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.103 Indeed, the
majority came to its conclusion by reviving principles of analysis utilized
during the pre-Rehnquist period of general acquiescence, including,
principally, the rational basis test. The Court reassumed a position of
substantial legislative deference by refusing to make an aggressive
inquiry into the federal government’s policy justification, namely that
failing to regulate purely intrastate, medicinal use of marijuana would
undercut the federal government’s larger anti-drug regulatory program
under the Controlled Substances Act.
97. Id. at 610–13; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Medical Marijuana Case: A Commerce Clause
Counter-Revolution?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 879, 881 (2005).
98. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995);
Pushaw, supra note 97, at 881 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 34–43
(1937); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942).
99. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
100. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611–19; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564–68; Pushaw, supra note 97, at
881.
101. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.
102. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2005).
103. Somin, supra note 3 (“If [Raich] has not quite put an end to the Rehnquist Court’s
‘federalism revolution,’ it certainly represents an important step in that direction.”).
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1. Facts and procedural history
In 2002, two California medical patients—Raich and Monson—
using physician-recommended marijuana to treat serious medical
conditions brought suit to enjoin the U.S. Attorney General and the DEA
from enforcing the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) to the extent that
it prevented them from possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing
marijuana for personal medical use.104 Although the patients were using
cannabis pursuant to the California Compassionate Use Act—adopted by
initiative in 1996 to allow “seriously ill” residents to gain access to
marijuana for medical purposes—federal agents seized and destroyed
their plants under the auspices of the CSA.105 The patients argued, among
other things, that enforcing the CSA violated the Commerce Clause
because personal medicinal marijuana use is a noneconomic, intrastate
activity outside the constitutional jurisdiction of the federal
government.106 The district court denied their motion for an injunction,
however, noting that although “federal enforcement interests ‘wane[d]’
when compared to the harm that [they] would suffer if denied access to
medically necessary marijuana,” they could not demonstrate likely
success on their legal claims.107
The Ninth Circuit reversed and ordered the District Court to enter a
preliminary injunction on their finding that the CSA, as applied to the
patients, was likely “an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s
Commerce Clause authority.”108 The Court of Appeals distinguished this
case from prior cases dismissing Commerce Clause challenges to the
CSA by identifying the patients’ use of medicinal marijuana as a
“separate and distinct class of activit[y],” namely, “the intrastate,
noncommercial cultivation and possession of cannabis for personal
medical purposes as recommended by a patient’s physician pursuant to
valid California state law.”109 The court explained that medicinal
marijuana use is different from drug trafficking because it is a narrowly
limited activity, disconnected from the broader commercial market for
marijuana, and involves the use of cannabis that is not intended for, and
does not enter, the stream of commerce.110 The Ninth Circuit relied

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Raich, 545 U.S. at 7–8.
Id.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 8 (quoting Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Cal. 2003)).
Id. (quoting Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1227 (2003)).
Id. (quoting Raich, 352 F.3d at 1228).
Id. a 8–9.
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heavily on Lopez and Morrison in off-setting this “separate class of
purely local activit[y]” beyond the reach of federal power.111
2. Majority holding
In a 6–3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and
held that regulation of intrastate medicinal marijuana consumption falls
well within Congress’s commerce authority.112 Writing for the majority,
Justice Stevens explained that Congress’s authority to regulate activities
that “substantially affect interstate commerce” is very well established,113
and that Wickard in particular controlled the outcome of this case
because under remarkably similar circumstances, the Wickard Court held
that “Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself
‘commercial’ . . . if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of
activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that
commodity.”114 Just as the plaintiff in Wickard challenged the
Agricultural Adjustment Act by arguing that his consumption of excess
wheat was a purely intrastate, non-commercial activity,115 Raich and
Monson argued that their medicinal marijuana use should be excepted
from the CSA. In both cases, however, private consumption of a
“fungible commodity,” taken in the aggregate, would directly impact the
interstate market for that commodity, and thus interfere with Congress’s
prerogative to control the supply and demand in both lawful and
unlawful markets.116
Instead of keeping to a narrow decision, the Court went on to breathe
new life into Wickard’s “rational basis” test for congressional legislation
implemented under the auspices of the Commerce Clause.117 Justice
Stevens explained that since the Court has “never required Congress to
make particularized findings in order to legislate,”118 the majority was
content with a finding that Congress “could have rationally concluded
that the aggregate impact on the national market of all the transactions
exempted from federal supervision is unquestionably substantial.”119

111. Id. at 9.
112. Id. at 10, 22.
113. Id. at 16–17 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 27 (1937)).
114. Id. at 18 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118 (1942)) (emphasis added).
115. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 113–15.
116. Raich, 545 U.S. at 19, 22.
117. Id. 18–19, 22.
118. Id. at 21.
119. Id. at 32.
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Indeed, the Court went to great lengths to distinguish Raich from
Lopez and Morrison to avoid the burden of actually assessing the effect
of the targeted activity on interstate commerce or even the likelihood that
such activity would “undercut” a larger regulatory scheme.120 Justice
Stevens correctly asserted that the pivotal distinction between Lopez and
Morrison and the case at bar was that the former cases challenged the
constitutionality of a particular statute as beyond Congress’s commerce
authority, while Raich sought to excise individual applications of an
otherwise valid statute.121 Moreover, the former challenges were
sustained because the statutes at issue did not target “economic
activity,”122 while those activities regulated by the CSA are
“quintessentially economic.”123 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
broadly defined “economic activity” to include “the production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities.”124
Justice Stevens explained further that where a class of activity thus
regulated falls within the reach of federal power—such as regulation of
the interstate drug market—“the courts have no power ‘to excise, as
trivial, individual instances’ of the class.”125 Thus, when “a general
regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de
minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of
no consequence.”126 Since the CSA is a generally valid statute regulating
the production and consumption “of commodities for which there is an
established, and lucrative, interstate market,”127 and the exemption of
marijuana cultivated for personal use may have a substantial effect on the
interstate market for that commodity,128 the Court refused to excise the
120. See id. at 23–27.
121. Id. at 23.
122. See id. (“The [Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990] did not regulate any economic
activity and did not contain any requirement that the possession of a gun have any connection to past
interstate activity or a predictable impact on future commercial activity.”); id. at 25 (“The Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 . . . created a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated
crimes of violence . . . . Despite congressional findings that such crimes had an adverse impact on
interstate commerce, we held the statute unconstitutional because, like the statute in Lopez, it did not
regulate economic activity. We concluded that ‘the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at
issue was central to our decision’ in Lopez . . . .”).
123. Id. at 25.
124. Id. at 25–26 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966)).
125. Id. (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (internal quotations
omitted)).
126. Id. at 17 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)) (internal quotations
omitted)).
127. Id. at 26.
128. Id. at 28 (“[A] nationwide exemption for the vast quantity of marijuana (or other drugs)
locally cultivated for personal use (which presumably would include use by friends, neighbors, and
family members) may have a substantial impact on the interstate market for this extraordinarily
popular substance.”).
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narrow class of medicinal marijuana from the larger class of substances
covered by the CSA.
3. Scalia’s concurrence
Justice Scalia tried—unsuccessfully129—to limit the scope of Raich
by arguing that Congress may exert its commerce authority over
noneconomic intrastate activity only where the failure to do so “‘could
. . . undercut its regulation of interstate commerce.’”130 Congress’s
regulatory authority over activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce—and are thus not part of interstate commerce—derives from
the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution.131 The Constitution
thus provides that if Congress has the authority to regulate some activity
affecting interstate commerce, “it [also] possesses every power needed to
make that regulation effective,”132 even if some intrastate transactions
may thereby be controlled.133 Since this power extends only to activity
necessary to make a comprehensive, interstate regulation effective,134
Justice Scalia did not view it as a serious threat to federalism.135 He
accordingly concluded that because the Commerce Clause
unquestionably permits federal regulation of the interstate market for
Schedule I controlled substances,136 and excising personal marijuana use
for medical purposes would undercut Congress’s objective of prohibiting
marijuana from the interstate market,137 the federal government has
constitutional authority to enforce the CSA against intrastate, noncommercial use of that commodity.

129. Subsequent U.S. Circuit Court decisions have disregarded this assertion. See, e.g., United
States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 42 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining that the majority in Raich does not
require Congress to delineate regulated classes with “scientific exactitude”) (quoting Raich, 545 U.S.
at 17).
130. Raich, 545 U.S. at 38 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561) (emphasis
added).
131. Id. at 34; see U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States . . . .”).
132. Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110,
118–19 (1942) (internal quotations omitted)).
133. Id. at 38 (citing Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 353 (1914)).
134. Id. at 37–38.
135. Id. at 38–39.
136. Id. at 39–40.
137. Id. at 40–42.
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B. Raich’s Effect on Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
As the broadest assertion of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority
yet upheld by the Supreme Court,138 Raich not only threatens to
undermine the limiting framework articulated in Lopez and Morrison, but
also demonstrably signals a return to the pre-Lopez era of nearly
unchecked federal incursion into traditional state powers. First, Raich
provides a definition for economic activity—“the production,
distribution, and consumption of commodities”139—that admits to no
limit on the scope of activity within Congress’s regulatory power.140
Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas,
criticized this definition as excessively broad,141 warning that it
threatened to sweep all “productive human activity” into Congress’s
regulatory purview. The dissenting Justices warned further that drawing
the line where every private activity affects the demand for a regulated
market good “is to draw no line at all, and to declare everything
economic.”142 Indeed, virtually all activity involves the “distribution” or
“consumption” of a commodity that has traveled through interstate
commerce or affects the market demand for that product.143 It is difficult
to imagine how the simple constitutional directive “[t]o regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States”144 has come to encompass
regulation of any activity involving the production, distribution, or
consumption of a commodity whose aggregate effect exerts a substantial
impact on interstate commerce. As some predicted,145 circuit courts have
even found a way to construe violent criminal conduct as economic
activity.146

138. Somin, supra note 3.
139. Raich, 545 U.S. at 25–26 (Stevens, J., majority).
140. Id. at 49–50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Somin, supra note 3, at 513–17.
141. Raich, 545 U.S. at 49–50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s definition of economic
activity is breathtaking. It defines as economic any activity involving the production, distribution,
and consumption of commodities. And it appears to reason that when an interstate market for a
commodity exists, regulating the intrastate manufacture or possession of that commodity is
constitutional either because the intrastate activity is itself economic, or because regulating it is a
rational part of regulating its market.”).
142. Id.
143. Somin, supra note 3, at 514.
144. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
145. Id. at 515–16 (speculating that a court might rationally construe murder, rape, or theft as
economic activity subject to congressional regulation under the Raich definition of economic
activity) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 43 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining that
racketeering is “sufficiently economic in nature that it may be aggregated for Commerce Clause
purposes”).
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Second, Raich makes it easier for Congress to regulate noneconomic,
intrastate activity—which is traditionally beyond Congress’s
constitutional reach—if such activity is incident to a broader regulatory
scheme.147 Referring to this as a “superficial and formalistic
distinction[],”148 Justice O’Connor lamented in her dissent that Raich
relegates Lopez to “nothing more than a drafting guide,” directing
Congress to legislate broadly to include activities that might not
otherwise fall within its regulatory authority.149 Although the Raich
Court reiterated the Lopez standard permitting federal regulation of
noneconomic, intrastate activity only where it is an “essential part of a
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme
could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated,”150 it gave
little credence to the words “essential” and “undercut.” Indeed, the Court
emphasized that Congress is not required to provide “particularized”
findings of a need to include intrastate, noneconomic activity in its
broader regulatory scheme.151 Thus, Congress can shoehorn virtually any
regulation by implicitly or explicitly designating it as an essential
component of a larger interstate regulatory scheme.152 As one
constitutional scholar has suggested, this approach would allow Congress
to reenact the Gun Free School Zone Act struck down in Lopez by
simply incorporating it into the No Child Left Behind Act.153 This
standard consequently leaves no activity beyond Congress’s regulatory
grasp.
Third, Raich reasserted the “rational basis” test for assessing
congressional determinations that a particular activity, taken in the
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.154 Even though
Lopez and Morrison cast doubt on the “rational basis” test,155 and
Morrison in particular struck down the Violence Against Women Act
notwithstanding extensive congressional findings asserting substantial

147. Raich, 545 U.S. at 46 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Somin, supra note 3, at 516–18.
148. Raich, 545 U.S. at 47 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 46 (“Today’s decision allows Congress to regulate intrastate activity without check,
so long as there is some implication by legislative design that regulating intrastate activity is
essential . . . to the interstate regulatory scheme.”).
150. Raich, 545 U.S. at 24–25 (Stevens, J., majority) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (internal quotations omitted)).
151. Id. at 21; Somin, supra note 3, at 516–17.
152. Raich, 545 U.S. at 46 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Somin, supra note 3, at 517.
153. Somin, supra note 3, at 518.
154. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (Stevens, J., majority) (“We need not determine whether
respondents’ activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but
only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so concluding.”).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 92–93.
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effects on interstate commerce,156 Raich suggests that the Court will
uphold regulations touching even intrastate, noneconomic activity if a
rational basis for such an effect exists.157
Justice O’Connor also argued in her dissent that the majority’s
reliance on Wickard—the most “far reaching example of Commerce
Clause authority of intrastate activity”158—to support a revival of the
“rational basis” test is misplaced. She distinguished the case on two
bases: first, the Wickard Court “looked to ‘the actual effects159 of the
activity in question’” by consulting substantial evidence provided by the
parties sufficient to leave “no doubt” about the activity’s substantial
effects on interstate commerce;160 and second, Wickard did not hold or
imply that small-scale production of commodities is always economic,
substantially affects interstate commerce, or is automatically within
Congress’s reach.161
Indeed, the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) at issue in Wickard
specifically exempted small-scale, non-commercial wheat cultivation,
and, thus, the Court could not possibly have approved congressional
regulation of such limited activity.162 By contrast, the CSA reaches much
further than the AAA into small-scale, intrastate, non-commercial
production of commodities by, for example, regulating the production
and consumption of small quantities of medicinal marijuana for personal
use. Moreover, the Raich Court came to its conclusion with little
evidence to support the government’s claim that homegrown medicinal
marijuana users constitute, in the aggregate, a substantial enough class to

156. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000); Somin, supra note 3, at 518.
157. See, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 32 (explaining the Court is content with a finding that
Congress “could have rationally concluded that the aggregate impact on the national market of all
the transactions exempted from federal supervision is unquestionably substantial”).
158. Id. at 50 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995)).
159. Id. at 53 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120, 125 (1942)).
160. Id. (citing Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128–29) (emphasis added) (“After reviewing in detail the
picture of the industry provided in [the stipulated summary of the economics of the wheat industry],
the Court explained that consumption of homegrown wheat was the most variable factor in the size
of the national wheat crop, and that on-site consumption could have the effect of varying the amount
of wheat sent to market by as much as 20 percent.”).
161. Id. at 51.
162. Id. (“Wickard involved a challenge to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (AAA),
which directed the Secretary of Agriculture to set national quotas on wheat production, and penalties
for excess production. The AAA itself confirmed that Congress made an explicit choice not to
reach—and thus the Court could not possibly have approved of federal control over-small-scale,
noncommercial wheat farming. In contrast to the CSA’s limitless assertion of power, Congress
provided an exemption within the AAA for small producers. When Filburn planted the wheat at
issue in Wickard, the statute exempted plantings less than 200 bushels (about six tons), and when he
harvested his wheat it exempted plantings less than six acres.”) (internal citations omitted).
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have any discernable—let alone substantial—effect on the interstate drug
market, or might otherwise undercut the CSA regime.163
Finally, Raich’s expansion of the broader regulatory scheme
exception and the “rational basis” test for substantial effects make “asapplied” Commerce Clause challenges nearly impossible.164 While lower
courts already demonstrated some reluctance to take seriously the
standards articulated in Lopez and Morrison,165 Raich confirmed their
doubts about the lasting effects of the “Rehnquist Revolution.”166 Indeed,
Raich effectively limited the principles articulated in Lopez and
Morrison to facial statutory challenges by dismissing potentially
unconstitutional applications of otherwise-valid statutes as matters of “no
consequence.”167
This principle was confirmed in United States v. Stewart,168 a case
remanded concurrently with Raich,169 in which the Ninth Circuit
explained that, in light of Raich, an as-applied challenge to a federal
statute prohibiting possession of machine guns could not be sustained
even though the defendant manufactured and assembled his own
machine guns.170 The Ninth Circuit originally reversed Stewarts’
conviction, finding that the statute at issue failed all four parts of the
Morrison test,171 but it subsequently held that Raich permits Congress to
regulate even intrastate noneconomic activity when that activity falls
incident to a larger regulatory program.172 Since Congress could
rationally conclude that possession of a homemade machine gun could
affect the national market for machine guns, Stewart’s as-applied
challenge was of “no consequence” in light of the broader regulatory
program in the balance.173 The same principle guided the outcome of
other cases remanded after or concurrently with Raich in the context of

163. Id. at 53.
164. See Somin, supra note 3, at 518; Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, What Hath
Raich Wrought? Five Takes, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 915, 916–18 (2005); Jonathan H. Adler, Is
Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) Overdose, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751, 753–
54 (2005).
165. Reynolds & Denning, supra note 164, at 916; see also Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P.
Denning, What if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000
WIS. L. REV. 369 (2000).
166. Reynolds & Denning, supra note 164, at 918 (“[T]he as-applied challenges to which
lower courts had been warming are likely over.”).
167. Raich, 545 U.S. at 17.
168. 451 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2006).
169. United States v. Stewart, 545 U.S. 1112 (2005).
170. Stewart, 451 F.3d at 1078.
171. Id. at 1074.
172. Id. at 1076–78.
173. Id. at 1077–78.
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federal child pornography statutes.174 What follows, however, is perhaps
the most egregious example of federal incursion on traditional state
powers pursuant to the standards articulated in Raich. In contrast to asapplied challenges to statutes regulating economic commodities—
marijuana, machine guns, and pornography—United States v.
Nascimento175 took the Raich framework a step further by applying it to
noneconomic criminal activity.
IV. A CLARION CALL FOR LIMITS: FEDERAL APPROPRIATION OF STATE
POLICE POWERS IN UNITED STATES V. NASCIMENTO
In United States v. Nascimento, the First Circuit allowed federal
prosecutors to convict local street gang members under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) for noneconomic
violent criminal conduct that neither targeted interstate commerce nor
reached beyond the borders of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.176
The Sixth Circuit, however, squarely rejected a nearly identical case just
a few years prior—unencumbered by Raich—as an unconstitutional
exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.177 These cases aptly
demonstrate how courts are using Raich to obliterate the distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local by blindly
acquiescing to federal appropriation of even core state powers.
A. United States v. Nascimento
In the late 1990s, two rival gangs in Boston—named after the streets
Wendover and Stonehurst—commenced a violent campaign of murder
that culminated in a string of federal criminal prosecutions. After a
lengthy investigation, a federal grand jury indicted thirteen members of
the Stonehurst gang on three criminals counts, including, principally, an
alleged violation of RICO based on their membership in Stonehurst, a socalled racketeering enterprise.178 The government’s indictment alleged
that Stonehurst’s primary purpose was “‘to shoot and kill members,
associates, and perceived supporters of a rival gang in Boston known as
Wendover,’” and offered evidence of nearly two dozen murders and

174. See United States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming on remand a
conviction under the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996); United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d
1276 (11th Cir. 2006).
175. 491 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2007).
176. Id. at 30–32.
177. United States v. Waucaush, 380 F.3d 251 (6th Cir. 2004).
178. Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 30.
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instances of assault with intent to kill to support the indictment.179
Although some members of Stonehurst sold drugs, the gang was not
primarily or collectively engaged in drug trafficking, and its criminal
activity was limited to the Dorchester area of Boston.180 After a brief
trial, the federal court sentenced defendant Nascimento and others to
prison for terms ranging between four and fifteen years.
1. The missing elements of federal jurisdiction: economic activity and
substantial effects
The Nascimento prosecution is troubling because although the
Stonehurst gang engaged in violent criminal conduct, their activities
were confined to the Boston area and did not target interstate commerce.
RICO’s principal liability provision targets criminal enterprises “engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate commerce . . . through a
pattern of racketeering activity.”181 To convict a defendant of a
substantive RICO violation, the government must demonstrate: “(1) an
enterprise existed; (2) the enterprise participated in or its activities
affected interstate commerce; (3) the defendant was employed by or was
associated with the enterprise; (4) the defendant conducted or
participated in the conduct of the enterprise; (5) through a pattern of
racketeering activity.”182 Thus, RICO’s key “jurisdictional hook” to
Congress’s Article I Commerce Clause powers requires that the
defendants’ conduct in some way affect interstate commerce.183
In Nascimento, the effect of Stonehurst’s criminal conduct on
interstate commerce was tenuous at best. The district court instructed the
jury, however, that federal jurisdictional requirements would be satisfied
if the government demonstrated that Stonehurst’s activities had at least a
de minimis effect on interstate commerce, regardless of the economic
nature of such conduct.184 Nascimento appealed, arguing among other
things that the RICO statute as applied to an enterprise engaged
exclusively in noneconomic criminal activity is unconstitutional.185
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Frank D’Angelo, Note, Turf Wars: Street Gangs and the Outer Limits of RICO’s
“Affecting Commerce” Requirement 76 FORDHAM L.REV. 2075, 2076 (2008) (citing 18 U.S.C.S. §
1962(c)). RICO defines racketeering as “any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling,
arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance.”
18 U.S.C.S. § 1961(1)(A).
182. Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 31 (quoting United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 33 (1st Cir.
2002)).
183. D’Angelo, supra note 181, at 2075.
184. Id.
185. Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 40.
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Relying on the trilogy of recent Supreme Court cases establishing
limits on the federal government’s Commerce Clause powers—
Morrison, Jones, and Lopez—Nascimento asserted that the effect of
noneconomic criminal activity could not be aggregated to establish the
substantial effect on interstate commerce requisite to federal
intervention.186 Although the Court has long maintained that individual
instances of conduct need not be substantial if the conduct, taken in the
aggregate, would substantially affect interstate commerce, Lopez limits
aggregation to strictly “economic” activity.187 Indeed, the Court in
Morrison explicitly “‘reject[ed] the argument that Congress may regulate
non-economic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s
aggregate effect on interstate commerce,’”188 adding that the
“‘suppression of violent crime and the vindication of its victims’ was
quintessentially within the police power of the several states (and, by
implication, not within the federal commerce power per se).”189
Nascimento argued further that Stonehurst’s criminal conduct was
indistinguishable from the type of conduct the Morrison Court refused to
aggregate, namely noneconomic violent crime.190 Stonehurst was an
organization committed principally to killing members of the Wendover
gang.191 They were not engaged in the interstate drug trade, nor did they
kill for money.192 The untenable links to commerce offered by federal
prosecutors included a single incident in which members of Stonehurst
incidentally ambushed and shot a Wendover gang member at a 24-hour
tire service center catering to interstate traffic, causing the store to close
for several hours in the middle of the night;193 and Stonehurst members’
use of cellular phones to coordinate their criminal activities.194
Though seemingly indistinguishable from cell-phone use, the court
inexplicably latched onto Stonehurst’s maintenance and use of a small
arsenal of firearms as an incontrovertible link to commerce.195 The court
thought it significant that all but one of the nine firearms was
manufactured in another state, and that one convicted member of the
gang traveled from Massachusetts to neighboring New Hampshire to

186. Id. at 40–41.
187. Id. at 40 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–560 (1995)).
188. Id. (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000)).
189. Id. (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618).
190. Id. at 41, 43–44.
191. Id. at 30.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 43–44.
194. Id. at 44.
195. Id. at 45. Upon learning that Stonehurst maintained an arsenal of at least nine firearms,
the district court concluded that the gang was a “massive purchaser of guns.” Id.
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purchase a firearm that later became part of the Stonehurst arsenal and
was allegedly used to shoot at a car thought to be carrying members of
the Wendover gang.196 Noting that other circuit courts have refused to
uphold federal criminal convictions on the basis of a defendant’s use of a
weapon that had traveled through interstate commerce,197 the court
concluded that the arsenal of weapons manufactured in another state
combined with the out-of-state firearm purchase was a sufficient link to
commerce.198
More importantly, the First Circuit held that Raich does not require
courts to analyze the effect of a particular activity on interstate
commerce if federal regulation of that activity falls within a
comprehensive regulatory scheme.199 Thus, because Nascimento’s appeal
entails a challenge to a generally valid statute—RICO—Raich only
requires the court to determine whether Congress acted “rationally”
when making a policy judgment that a purely intrastate criminal activity
is an essential part of the larger anti-racketeering regime.200 If the statute
is based on a rational policy judgment—as the court concluded here—
Raich prohibits courts from “excising” individual components of a larger
“class of activity” targeted by Congress.201 The court noted that although
Justice Scalia attributes to the majority a limitation “that Congress may
regulate non-economic intrastate activities ‘only where the failure to do
so could . . . undercut its regulation of interstate commerce,’” their
understanding of the Raich opinion is that regulated classes need not be
delineated with “scientific exactitude.”202 In other words, “Raich teaches
that when Congress is addressing a problem that is legitimately within its
purview, an inquiring court should be slow to interfere.”203
In the instant case, therefore, the court determined only whether
Congress rationally targeted a “class of activity” that has a substantial
relationship to interstate commerce rather than determining whether the
specific activity at issue—which falls within the larger class—
independently affects interstate commerce. As the court reiterated, “the
intrastate or non-economic character of individual instances within the

196. Id. at 45.
197. Id. (“‘[I]t is one thing for Congress to prohibit possession of a weapon that has itself
moved in interstate commerce, but it is quite another thing for Congress to prohibit homicides using
such weapons.’”) (quoting United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2000)).
198. Id. at 45.
199. Id. at 41–43.
200. Id. at 42.
201. Id.
202. Id. (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
203. Id. at 42.
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class is of no consequence.”204 Stated differently, federal infringements
on core state powers are mere collateral damage if such infringements
are incident to—not even necessary for—a larger regulatory program.
Since the RICO statute focuses narrowly on racketeering, and
racketeering is, as the court described it, “based largely on greed,” the
court concluded that the general class of activity known as racketeering
was “sufficiently economic in nature that it may be aggregated for
Commerce Clause purposes.”205 In other words, because intrastate gang
warfare falls within a class of activity known as “racketeering,” and
because racketeering falls within a class of activity motivated by
“greed,” and because activities motivated by greed fall generally within a
broader class of “economic activity,” Congress could rationally target
local street gang warfare as an activity that has a “substantial
relationship” to interstate commerce. The court hence transformed a
common form of violent criminal misconduct into “economic activity” to
avoid the Lopez limitation that only “economic” activity be aggregated
for purposes of Commerce Clause regulation. Thus, the First Circuit did
exactly what the Morrison Court would not: equate violent criminal
conduct with economic activity.206
B. United States v. Waucaush: A Pre-Raich Result
In 1997, the Sixth Circuit confronted a RICO prosecution207 nearly
identical to that in Nascimento but came to a different conclusion
unencumbered by Raich. The case involved seven members of a Detroitarea gang known as the Cash Flow Posse (CFP)—including Robert
Waucaush—charged with violating and conspiring to violate RICO. 208
The federal indictment alleged that Waucaush and his colleagues
murdered, conspired to murder, and assaulted with intent to murder,
members of two rival gangs in a citywide turf war.209 Despite the gang’s
name, however, CFP did not engage in any economic activity. Waucaush
accordingly moved to dismiss, arguing that his criminal acts did not
“affect interstate commerce” within the meaning of the RICO statute and
the Constitution.210 The district court denied Waucaush’s motion and
sentenced him to life in prison.211 Although initially denied, the Sixth
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 43 (citing Raich, 545 U.S. at 17).
Id. at 43.
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–19 (2000).
United States v. Waucaush, 380 F.3d 251 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 253.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 253–54.
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Circuit reconsidered Waucaush’s appeal after the Supreme Court decided
Jones and Morrison in 2000. The crux of his appeal required the court to
determine whether prosecutors could demonstrate that Waucaush
violated RICO by assisting an enterprise whose activities “affected”
interstate commerce and that regulation of such activity was within
Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.212
While CFP was not directly involved in interstate commerce, the
indictment against Waucaush alleged that he and others traveled on
interstate highways to commit crimes, used guns manufactured outside of
Michigan, and killed members of rival gangs engaged in drug trade.213
The court explained, however, that Lopez established two basic
limitations in Commerce Clause jurisprudence: (1) Congress can regulate
purely intrastate activity only when that activity “substantially affects”
interstate commerce, and (2) courts may not “pile inference upon
inference” to demonstrate a substantial effect for activities with
otherwise tenuous connections to interstate commerce.214
More importantly, the Morrison Court introduced a categorical rule
that ultimately controlled the outcome in Waucaush: “We . . . reject the
argument that Congress may regulate non-economic, violent, criminal
conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate
commerce.”215 The Sixth Circuit accordingly held that the federal
government could not maintain RICO charges against the defendants
because the effects of CFP’s intrastate, noneconomic violent criminal
activity could not be aggregated—by piling inference upon inference, or
otherwise—to establish “substantial effects on interstate commerce.”216
Even though CFP’s violent enterprise inevitably produced some
incidental effect on commerce—”a corpse cannot shop, after all”—the
court refused to “‘follow the but-for causal chain from the initial
occurrence of violent crime (the suppression of which has always been
the prime object of the States’ police power) to every attenuated effect
upon interstate commerce.’”217

212. Id. at 262.
213. Id. at 256–57.
214. Id. at 261; D’Angelo, supra note 181, at 2098.
215. Waucaush, 380 F.3d at 261 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617
(2000)) (internal quotations omitted).
216. Id. at 258.
217. Id. (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615).
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C. Why Nascimento and Waucaush Take Divergent Paths
Understanding how Raich guided the First Circuit’s conclusion in
Nascimento notwithstanding the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion in Waucaush
will explain how Raich threatens to unravel the judicial safeguards of
federalism. The Nascimento court ignored the outcome in Waucaush
because the Raich framework clearly supersedes the standards employed
in Waucaush.218 First, Raich’s expansive definition of economic activity
allowed the Nascimento court to somehow equate organized gang
violence with economic activity within Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority.219 Second, Raich required the Nascimento court to defer to
Congress’s decision to include organized violence in the larger class of
activity known as racketeering.220 Since the court saw an obvious tie
between organized violence and racketeering activity—given that the
former is a frequent concomitant of the latter—it concluded that such
activity is an essential part of the broader anti-racketeering regime, even
without evidence that failing to regulate intrastate gang violence would
somehow “undercut” Congress’s larger RICO policy objectives.221
Finally, Raich allowed the Nascimento court to punt on the issue of
whether the targeted activity—intrastate street gang violence—
substantially affects interstate commerce because it falls within
Congress’s regulatory purview pursuant to a comprehensive regulator
scheme.222 Raich, after all, prohibits courts from excising individual
components of a larger class of activity targeted by Congress, and thus
effectively kills any as-applied challenge to Commerce Clause
legislation.
While Nascimento may suffer from other analytical problems,223 it
aptly demonstrates how Raich enables judicial acquiescence to federal
appropriation of traditional state powers, including the very police
powers deemed sacrosanct in Lopez and Morrison.224

218. United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 51–53 (1st Cir. 2007).
219. Id. at 43; see supra text accompany notes 205–06. Even if Nascimento’s explanation of
the link between racketeering and economic activity proves untenable, the act of murder could still
be classified as an economic commodity that can be bought and sold by criminal perpetrators,
bringing such activity within Raich’s definition of economic activity. See Somin, supra note 3, at
515.
220. Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 42.
221. Id. at 43.
222. Id. (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005)).
223. Some argue that the Nascimento court failed to give sufficient weight to RICO’s
jurisdictional hook as evidence of Congress’s intent to regulate pursuant to its fullest constitutional
authority under a case-by-case inquiry. See, e.g., First Circuit Upholds Application of RICO to
Criminal Gang Not Engaged in Economic Activity, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1961, 1964 (2008).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 62 and 83.
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V. CONCLUSION
The progeny of Gonzales v. Raich demonstrates that meaningful
judicial review of laws enacted under the Commerce Clause may be at an
end. While Raich muddled the standards raised in Lopez and Morrison,
however, it did not distinguish or overrule them. Thus, Lopez, Morrison,
and Jones still provide a workable limit on the Commerce Clause powers
if the Court will give effect to their guiding principles. Since Raich
simply exploited the ambiguities of Lopez and Morrison to vitiate the
force of their precedents while still purporting to work within their
framework, a new coalition amenable to “federalism as substantive
limits”225 could just as easily exploit Raich’s lip service to the LopezMorrison standard to limit Raich.226
A return to meaningful limits on the Commerce Clause powers
requires the Court, first and foremost, to give effect to the words
“essential” and “undercut” in the broader regulatory program
exception.227 If the Court gives any credence to the constitutional limits
on federal power, it cannot accept at face value Congress’s whimsical
inclusion of an activity otherwise beyond its regulatory purview in a
broader regulatory program. Second, the Court should refine the
definition of “economic activity” to preclude courts from transforming
activity universally understood to be outside of Congress’s commerce
authority—such as intrastate criminal misconduct—into economic
activity. Finally, the Court should reassert its role in protecting the
federal balance by eschewing the “rational basis” test without
meaningful inquiry.
As Justice Kennedy aptly lamented, of the various structural
elements in the Constitution—separation of powers, checks and balances,
judicial review, and federalism—only concerning the last does there
seem to be apprehension about the Court’s role in preserving the
Framers’ carefully wrought safeguards.228 If the Court does not correct
its dithering federalism doctrine, nothing will impede federal incursion
into matters of state sovereignty. A return to meaningful limits does not
require the Court to overturn Raich, however. The Court must simply
give effect to the clear standards articulated in Lopez and Morrison, and
take seriously its charge to decide controversies “arising under [the]
225. See Chemerinsky, supra note 22.
226. Somin, supra note 3, at 550.
227. Raich, 545 U.S. at 24–25 (explaining that intrastate, noneconomic activity included in the
broader regulatory scheme exception must be an “essential part[] of a larger regulation of economic
activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated”) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)) (internal quotations omitted).
228. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Constitution”229 rather than deferring blindly to Congress’s regulatory
judgments.
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